Mr. Counsel, the appellant says the Children's Court did not pass an order under Section 19(1). Is that not a mandatory requirement under the JJ Act?

My Lord, while Section 19(1) requires the Children's Court to decide whether the child should be tried as an adult or as a child, the word 'may' is used, and it is permissive. In the present case, the Juvenile Justice Board had already conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15 and found that the appellant should be tried as an adult. The Children's Court was entitled to rely on this assessment. Moreover, the appellant did not raise any objection at any stage. He cannot now raise it for the first time in the Supreme Court. Even if there was any irregularity, it did not cause any prejudice to the appellant, who had a full and fair trial.

But in Ajeet Gurjar, this Court held that the word 'may' in Section 19(1) must be read as 'shall'. How do you get around that?

My Lord, in Ajeet Gurjar, the issue was raised at the trial stage itself, and this Court remitted the matter to the Children's Court for compliance with Section 19(1). That shows that the appropriate remedy is remand, not acquittal. In the present case, the appellant did not raise this objection at any stage. He is raising it for the first time in the Supreme Court. The principle of waiver applies. Moreover, unlike in Thirumoorthy, where there was no preliminary assessment at all, in the present case the Board conducted a thorough preliminary assessment under Section 15 and found that the appellant should be tried as an adult. The Children's Court proceeded on that basis. There was substantial compliance with the procedural requirements.

The appellant has been in jail for over six years. Even if the conviction is upheld, should the sentence be reduced?

My Lord, the sentence of 14 years was imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. The offence is heinous, and the victim lost his life. The sentence is in accordance with law. However, if this Court is inclined to show leniency, it could consider reducing the sentence to the period already undergone, or to a shorter period, while confirming the conviction. The appellant should not be acquitted on a technicality, but the Court could consider the period of incarceration already undergone as a mitigating factor. We leave it to the wisdom of the Court.

The appellant was 16.5 years old at the time of the offence. Under the JJ Act, the maximum sentence for a child tried as a child is three years. If he was tried as an adult, is that not a serious prejudice?

My Lord, the appellant was not tried as a child because the Board found that he should be tried as an adult. The Board conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15 and considered his mental and physical capacity, his ability to understand the consequences of the offence, and the circumstances of the offence. Based on that assessment, the Board opined that he should be tried as an adult. The Children's Court proceeded accordingly. The appellant did not challenge the Board's assessment or the Children's Court's decision to proceed as a sessions case. He participated in the trial without any objection. He cannot now claim that he was prejudiced by being tried as an adult. The procedure was followed, and the appellant had a fair trial.

For RespondentCriminal Premium

Board Assessment Sufficient Children's Court Need Not Repeat — (2026) INSC 692

The Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary assessment under Section 15, which found that the appellant should be tried as an adult, was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Children's Court.

Sagar v. State of Haryana — (2026) INSC 692

Core Argument

The Juvenile Justice Board's preliminary assessment under Section 15, which found that the appellant should be tried as an adult, was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Children's Court. The Children's Court was not required to pass a separate order under Section 19(1) because the Board's assessment was already on record and the appellant did not object to the procedure at any stage.

Key Precedents

Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023) 15 SCC 678 — Held that the word 'may' in Section 19(1) must be read as 'shall' and that holding an inquiry is not an empty formality; however, remitted the matter for compliance rather than quashing the conviction.

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