Argument Lab

Key Precedents

• Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 8 SCR 133 — Held that the evidence of a partisan witness must be carefully weighed but not mechanically rejected, and that a relative of the deceased is a natural witness.
• Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC 627 — Held that the evidence of a hostile witness is not completely effaced and can be accepted to the extent it is found dependable.
• State of U.P. v. Kishanpal (2008) 16 SCC 73 — Held that minor discrepancies in medical evidence do not destroy the prosecution case if the core finding is consistent.

Key Precedents

• Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 8 SCR 133 — Held that while the evidence of a partisan or interested witness cannot be mechanically rejected, the court must be very careful in weighing such evidence.
• Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 6 SCC 591 — Held that a witness with a strong interest in the result should not be weighed on the same scales as a disinterested witness, as bias may unconsciously affect testimony.
• Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey (2022) 12 SCC 657 — Held that a postmortem report is not substantive evidence; the doctor's statement in court alone is substantive, and discrepancies diminish evidentiary value.

Key Precedents

• Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 — Established that the voter's right to know the antecedents of candidates is fundamental to democracy and is embedded in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
• Krishnamoorthy v. Shivakumar (2015) 14 SCC 58 — Held that non-furnishing of information pertaining to criminal antecedents causes undue influence and impedes the free exercise of electoral right, and the question whether the election was materially affected would not arise.
• Pritam Singh v. State (1950 INSC 9) — Established that Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and will be exercised only in special or exceptional cases; no such case exists here.

Key Precedents

• Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 — Established the voter's right to know antecedents of candidates, but the information must be relevant and material to the voter's decision.
• Krishnamoorthy v. Shivakumar (2015) 14 SCC 58 — Relied upon by the respondents, but distinguishable because that case involved serious IPC offences, not a technical NI Act offence.
• Pritam Singh v. State (1950 INSC 9) — Established the discretionary nature of Article 136 of the Constitution, which should be exercised in favour of the petitioner given the exceptional circumstances.

Key Precedents

• Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746 — Supports the proposition that where parties have voluntarily settled and consent to divorce, the waiting period under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be waived.
• Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) — Supports the exercise of Article 142 powers in matrimonial settlements.

Key Precedents

• Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746 — Supreme Court held that the waiting period under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is directory, not mandatory, and can be waived by the court where the parties have settled all disputes and there is no possibility of reconciliation.
• Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) — Supreme Court exercised power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve marriage by mutual consent without waiting period where parties had settled all claims.

Key Precedents

• Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414 — Supreme Court held that the concept of shared household requires the woman to have lived there with the consent of the respondent; consent can be withdrawn.
• S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru (2021) 15 SCC 730 — Supreme Court held that while the right to reside is important, courts must balance the rights of all parties, including senior citizens.

Key Precedents

• Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414 — Supreme Court held that the concept of shared household includes the parental home of the husband or father, and a daughter has the right to reside there even without legal title.
• S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru (2021) 15 SCC 730 — Supreme Court held that the right to reside in shared household under Section 17 of the DV Act is enforceable even against parents-in-law.
• Vimlesh v. State of U.P. (2020) 6 ADJ 781 — Allahabad High Court held that an unmarried daughter cannot be evicted from the shared household by her parents under the Senior Citizens Act when she is in a domestic relationship.

Key Precedents

• Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988) 1 SCC 105 — Held that cruelty depends on the type of life the parties are accustomed to and their social conditions; what is cruelty in one case may not be in another.
• N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 — Held that the court must consider the context and the conduct of both parties when determining cruelty.

Key Precedents

• N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 — Established that under pre-1976 Section 10(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, cruelty required proof of reasonable apprehension of harm or injury; the deletion of these words in Section 13(1)(i-a) lowered the threshold.
• Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988) 1 SCC 105 — Held that intention is not a necessary element of cruelty, and the categories of cruelty are not closed; each case depends on its own facts including social status and profession.
• Chanderkala Trivedi v. Dr S.P. Trivedi (1993) 4 SCC 232 — Held that when mutual allegations are made and the marriage is dead, continuing litigation is an exercise in futility.

Key Precedents

• Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi (2001) 4 SCC 250 — Held that matrimonial matters must be decided on their own facts and that irretrievable breakdown should not be applied as a straitjacket formula for grant of divorce.
• N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 — Held that the petitioner must prove cruelty, and that the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, but the conduct must be such as to cause reasonable apprehension of harm or injury.

Key Precedents

• V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337 — Established that mental cruelty is conduct inflicting such mental pain that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together, and it is not necessary to prove injury to health.
• Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706 — Held that the cumulative effect of facts and circumstances must be considered, not isolated instances, and that a feeling of anguish and disappointment must be appreciated from attending facts.
• A. Jaychandra v. Aneel Kumar (2005) 2 SCC 22 — Held that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground by itself but can be borne in mind while determining whether the alleged grounds are made out.

Key Precedents

• Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 INSC 170) — Recognises that arrest must be justified with reasons, but does not require written grounds; the reasons can be recorded in the police diary as required by Section 47(2) of the BNSS 2023.
• Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014 INSC 463) — Requires police to follow procedural safeguards but does not mandate written grounds of arrest for the arrestee; it focuses on the notice to be given before arrest for certain offences.

Key Precedents

• Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 INSC 170) — Established that arrest cannot be made in a routine manner and causes irreversible damage to reputation and self-esteem; the power to arrest must be exercised cautiously with recorded reasons.
• Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014 INSC 463) — Held that arrest results in embarrassment, restricts freedom, leaves permanent scars, and that police must follow procedural safeguards before arresting for offences punishable with less than seven years.
• D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416 — Laid down detailed requirements for arrest and detention, including the obligation to inform the arrestee of his rights and to record grounds of arrest in writing.

Key Precedents

• Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v. Davies (1968) AC 1097 — House of Lords decision holding that the word 'where' in statutes is often used as a conditional conjunction meaning 'if' or 'whenever', not as a reference to a physical place.
• Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 — The foundational case establishing the Vishaka Guidelines, which the POSH Act was enacted to codify; emphasises that the objective is to provide a safe workplace free from sexual harassment.

Key Precedents

• Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v. Davies (1968) AC 1097 — Although cited by the respondent, this case supports the petitioner because it requires careful attention to the grammatical and contextual meaning of 'where'; here, the context of Section 11 being a procedural provision indicates that 'where' introduces the forum, not a mere condition.

Key Precedents

• Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972 INSC 134) — Cited by the State but actually supports the respondent because the case holds that courts must evaluate whether the discrepancy affects the substratum; here, the High Court found that the discrepancies went to the root of the prosecution case.
• K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 — Held that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is rebuttable and if the accused can show that the death was accidental or that there was no demand, the presumption stands discharged.

Key Precedents

• Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972 INSC 134) — Established that minor discrepancies or contradictions in witness statements do not warrant discarding the entire prosecution evidence unless they affect the substratum of the case.
• Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633 — Held that the phrase 'soon before death' in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 requires that the cruelty or harassment should have a proximate connection with the death, but does not require a fixed time gap; each case depends on its facts.

Key Precedents

• M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Taj Trapezium case) (1997) 2 SCC 353 — Established that industrial development and environmental protection are not mutually exclusive; the Court balanced heritage conservation with economic activity by imposing proportionate pollution control measures rather than shutting down all industry.
• Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647 — While establishing the precautionary principle, this Court also held that the principle must be applied in a reasoned, proportionate manner, not as a license for absolute prohibition without evidence.
• T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 324 — Recognised that sustainable development requires integration of conservation and development, and that courts should rely on expert committees for complex environmental fact-finding.

Key Precedents

• Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647 — Established the precautionary principle and polluter pays principle as part of Indian environmental jurisprudence, requiring courts to err on the side of conservation where there is scientific uncertainty about environmental harm.
• A.P. Pollution Control Board v. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718 — Affirmed that the precautionary principle places the burden of proof on the industrial developer to show that their activity will not cause irreversible environmental harm.
• T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 324 — Held that conservation of forests and wildlife is not subordinate to development needs, and that the principle of sustainable development requires integration of environmental concerns into all development decisions.

Key Precedents

• Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 — Supports that even without express words, exclusion of the Limitation Act can be implied from the scheme of the special law where it provides a complete and exhaustive limitation mechanism.
• State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 — Held that where a special statute provides for its own limitation and the consequences of delay, the general Limitation Act does not apply by necessary implication.

Key Precedents

• Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 — Established that exclusion of Section 5 requires express or clearly implied peremptory language such as 'shall be dismissed', which is absent in Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
• Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (2023) 10 SCC 531 — Held that a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted in condoning delays by State instrumentalities, and High Courts should avoid pedantry.