Counsel for the respondent, how do you answer Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which says Sections 4 to 24 apply to all special laws unless expressly excluded? Where is the express exclusion in Section 74?

My Lord, while Section 29(2) speaks of 'expressly excluded', this Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav has held that exclusion can also be implied from the scheme of the legislation. Here, the scheme of Section 74 — a precise period of 60 days plus a further precise period of 60 days — indicates that Parliament intended a total ceiling of 120 days. The proviso's language 'within a further period of 60 days' is peremptory. If Section 5 were to apply, the proviso would become meaningless because Section 5 permits extensions beyond any fixed period. Thus, the scheme implies exclusion.

But Section 103 of the 2013 Act says the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws. Doesn't that expressly keep the Limitation Act alive?

My Lord, Section 103 preserves only those other laws that are not inconsistent with the 2013 Act. The Limitation Act's Section 5 is inconsistent with the specific 120-day ceiling in Section 74. Where there is inconsistency, the special law — the 2013 Act — must prevail. The phrase 'not in derogation' means the 2013 Act does not repeal other laws, but it does not mean those other laws override the specific provisions of the 2013 Act. Section 74 is the specific provision; Section 5 is general.

The State has filed 530 appeals. If we dismiss them all on limitation without hearing merits, would that not cause grave injustice to the public exchequer?

My Lord, with respect, the public exchequer is not above the law. The State has the same limitation period as any other litigant. More importantly, the State is a model litigant and must set an example of diligence. These 530 appeals demonstrate a systemic failure — as this Court itself noted, 'official connivance'. Dismissing them on limitation sends a strong message to the State to reform its processes. The landowners have already waited years for their compensation; they should not be dragged into further litigation because of the State's negligence. Justice to the individual landowner outweighs the State's interest in reopening awards.

But the proviso itself uses the language 'sufficient cause'. Doesn't that indicate Parliament was borrowing from the Limitation Act's Section 5 concept?

My Lord, the proviso's use of 'sufficient cause' is a self-contained standard. It does not incorporate Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Many statutes use the phrase 'sufficient cause' without importing the entire Limitation Act framework. The proviso provides a specific 60-day window to show sufficient cause. Beyond that, the statute is silent — which means no further extension is available. If Parliament had intended Section 5 to apply, it would not have added the proviso at all; it would have simply said 'subject to the Limitation Act, 1963'. It did not do so.

For RespondentCivil Premium

Section 74 of RFCTLARR is Self-Contained, Excludes Section 5

Section 74 of RFCTLARR of the 2013 Act provides a complete and exhaustive limitation scheme with a 60-day period extendable by a further 60 days upon sufficient cause, leaving no room for Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/S S.V. Global Mill Limited — (2026) INSC 138

Core Argument

Key Precedents

Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 — Supports that even without express words, exclusion of the Limitation Act can be implied from the scheme of the special law where it provides a complete and exhaustive limitation mechanism.
State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 — Held that where a special statute provides for its own limitation and the consequences of delay, the general Limitation Act does not apply by necessary implication.

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