Counsel, if the proviso to Section 74 already gives you 60 days beyond the initial 60 days upon showing sufficient cause, why do you need Section 5 at all? Doesn't the proviso exhaustively cover delayed filings?

My Lord, the proviso does not exhaustively cover delayed filings. It merely provides an additional 60 days within which the appellant can show 'sufficient cause' to have the appeal treated as filed within the main period. It does not say that beyond 120 days no appeal shall be entertained. The proviso is subsumed within Section 74(1) and creates a total period of 120 days, but it does not contain any express words excluding the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which would apply beyond 120 days. This Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav held that exclusion requires express or clearly implied peremptory language — none exists here.

But isn't the 2013 Act a complete code by itself? Why should we borrow from the Limitation Act at all when Parliament deliberately provided a specific limitation scheme?

My Lord, Section 103 of the 2013 Act expressly states that the Act is 'in addition to and not in derogation of' any other law in force. Parliament consciously permitted borrowing from other enactments. More importantly, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a parliamentary mandate that applies Sections 4 to 24 to all special laws unless expressly excluded. The 2013 Act does not expressly exclude Section 5. The completeness of the 2013 Act comes from borrowing, not from isolation. This Court has repeatedly held that a special law is not a complete code merely because it provides its own limitation period.

If we apply Section 5, wouldn't that render the proviso meaningless? Why would Parliament provide a specific 60-day further period if Section 5 can give unlimited extensions?

My Lord, the proviso serves an important purpose: it gives the appellant an automatic additional 60 days without needing to separately invoke Section 5. Within the first 120 days, the appellant can rely on the proviso. Beyond 120 days, Section 5 operates. The two provisions coexist harmoniously. The proviso does not say 'no appeal shall be entertained after 120 days' — it is silent. Where Parliament wanted to exclude Section 5, as in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it used express language like 'shall be dismissed'. The absence of such language here shows Parliament intended Section 5 to apply.

But your client is the State — a model litigant. Shouldn't the State be held to a higher standard of diligence? Why condone the State's own negligence in filing these 530 appeals late?

My Lord, this Court in Sheo Raj Singh specifically held that a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted even for State instrumentalities. The State represents the public interest. Dismissing 530 appeals on technical limitation grounds would deprive the public exchequer of the opportunity to contest potentially erroneous compensation awards. Moreover, the delays here were largely not substantial. The High Courts dismissed the appeals without even examining the sufficiency of cause, solely on the ground that Section 5 does not apply. This judgment does not grant automatic condonation — it merely holds that Section 5 applies, and each case must be decided on its own cause. We are ready to show sufficient cause in each case.

For PetitionerCivil Premium

Section 5 of Limitation Act Must Apply Absent Express Exclusion

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act mandates that Sections 4 to 24 apply to all special laws prescribing different limitation periods unless expressly excluded. Section 74 contains no such express exclusion, and the proviso does not oust Section 5.

The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/S S.V. Global Mill Limited — (2026) INSC 138

Core Argument

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act mandates that Sections 4 to 24 apply to all special laws prescribing different limitation periods unless expressly excluded. Section 74 of RFCTLARR contains no such express exclusion, and the proviso does not oust Section 5.

Key Precedents

Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 — Established that exclusion of Section 5 requires express or clearly implied peremptory language such as 'shall be dismissed', which is absent in Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (2023) 10 SCC 531 — Held that a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted in condoning delays by State instrumentalities, and High Courts should avoid pedantry.

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