Mr. State counsel, the High Court has given a reasoned judgment acquitting the respondents. Under settled law, an appellate court should be slow to interfere with an acquittal. Why should we interfere here?

My Lord, it is true that appellate courts are slow to interfere with acquittals, but that principle applies when the High Court's reasoning is sound and based on evidence. Here, the High Court committed multiple legal errors. First, it held that demands after marriage are not 'dowry' — directly contradicting Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Second, it disregarded the mandatory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which requires the court to presume dowry death once foundational facts are proved. Third, it speculated about the respondents' economic status without any evidentiary basis. When an acquittal is based on fallacious reasoning and misreading of the law, this Court has repeatedly held that interference is not only permissible but necessary.

The conviction we are restoring is from 2001. The respondent Jamila Beg is now 94 years old. Do you seriously suggest she should be sent to prison at this age?

My Lord, the State acknowledges the petitioner's advanced age. Indeed, this Court has in its judgment already refrained from incarcerating Jamila Beg due to her age and physical frailty, and the State does not challenge that compassionate exercise of discretion. However, the respondent Ajmal Beg is not of advanced age. The heinous crime of dowry death — a young woman being set on fire for a motorcycle and television — cannot go unpunished. The 24-year delay in the justice system should not operate to confer impunity on the principal accused.

The prosecution's key witness — the maternal uncle — did not actually see the accused set the deceased on fire. He only saw them fleeing. Isn't that insufficient to establish causation?

My Lord, the prosecution does not rely solely on the maternal uncle's testimony for causation. We rely on the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Once we proved that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for dowry demands 'soon before death', the law requires the court to presume that the respondents caused the dowry death. The defence led no evidence to rebut this presumption. The maternal uncle's testimony that he saw the accused fleeing the spot is corroborative evidence, not the foundation of the prosecution case. The trial court correctly placed reliance on the presumption, and the High Court erroneously ignored it.

This case took 24 years from the date of the incident to reach us. The accused have been on bail for most of this period. How does the State explain this delay?

My Lord, the State does not defend the delay. This Court has itself noted in paragraph 26(d) of the judgment that 24 years is 'far too long' and has requested all High Courts to ascertain pending dowry cases and ensure expeditious disposal. The State accepts that systemic delays are a problem. However, the remedy for delay is not to acquit the accused on technical grounds or to allow them to benefit from the passage of time. The remedy is to fix the system — which this Court has directed — while still ensuring that justice is done on the merits. The evidence in this case clearly establishes dowry death, and the accused should not go unpunished because the system moved slowly.

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Presumption Under Section 113-B Unrebutted — (2025) INSC 1435

The prosecution established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for dowry demands 'soon before death'.

State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg — (2025) INSC 1435

Core Argument

The prosecution established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for dowry demands 'soon before death'. Under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the presumption of dowry death arises, and the defence led no evidence to rebut it.

Key Precedents

Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972 INSC 134) — Established that minor discrepancies or contradictions in witness statements do not warrant discarding the entire prosecution evidence unless they affect the substratum of the case.
Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633 — Held that the phrase 'soon before death' in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 requires that the cruelty or harassment should have a proximate connection with the death, but does not require a fixed time gap; each case depends on its facts.

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