Mr. Defence counsel, Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 explicitly says 'any time after the marriage'. How can you argue that demands after a dowry-less marriage are not 'dowry'? That reads the words out of the statute.

My Lord, the respondent does not argue that demands after marriage can never constitute dowry. The argument is that the demand must be 'in connection with the marriage' under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. If no dowry was demanded or paid at the time of marriage, and the marriage was a love marriage between consenting adults, subsequent demands for articles — even if proved — relate to a different transaction, not to the marriage itself. The High Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the necessary nexus. This is a plausible finding of fact that does not amount to a legal error.

The deceased was set on fire and died within a year of marriage. The last demand was made the day before. The accused offered no explanation for the death. Doesn't Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 compel a presumption against you?

My Lord, Section 113-B uses the word 'presume', but this Court has held that the presumption is rebuttable. The respondents have rebutted the presumption by demonstrating, through cross-examination, that the prosecution's foundational facts are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The father's testimony about demands is uncorroborated. The maternal uncle's testimony about fleeing is vague. There is no medical evidence linking the respondents to the act. When the foundational facts are themselves in doubt, the presumption does not arise, or if it arises, it is rebutted. The High Court correctly held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

The Trial Court had the benefit of observing the witnesses and believed them. The High Court reversed that without any finding of perversity. Isn't that precisely the kind of interference that appellate courts should avoid in criminal matters?

My Lord, the High Court is also an appellate court. In appeals against conviction, the High Court has full power to reappreciate evidence and come to its own conclusion. The limitation — that the High Court must show perversity or error — applies to the Supreme Court when interfering with a High Court's acquittal. Here, the High Court gave a reasoned judgment pointing out specific omissions, inconsistencies, and contradictions. That is not 'perversity'; it is a legitimate exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court should not interfere with a well-reasoned acquittal merely because the trial court took a different view.

Twenty-four years have passed since the incident. The accused has been on bail. If we uphold the acquittal, the message is that dowry death perpetrators can escape by delaying the legal process. What do you say to that?

My Lord, with respect, the delay is not attributable to the respondent. The respondent was in custody for a period, then was granted bail. The legal process took 24 years because of systemic delays — delays in the trial court, delays in the High Court, and now the respondent is before this Court. The respondent cannot be penalised for the system's inefficiency. If this Court were to convict the respondent solely because of the passage of time and public sentiment, that would be a grave miscarriage of justice. The respondent is entitled to be acquitted if the evidence does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, regardless of how much time has passed.

For RespondentCriminal Premium

High Court's Acquittal Based on Evidence — (2025) INSC 1435

The High Court correctly evaluated the evidence, found the prosecution's witnesses unreliable, and recorded a reasoned acquittal.

State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg — (2025) INSC 1435

Core Argument

The High Court correctly evaluated the evidence, found the prosecution's witnesses unreliable, and recorded a reasoned acquittal. The Supreme Court should not interfere with an acquittal in the absence of perversity or manifest error.

Key Precedents

Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972 INSC 134) — Cited by the State but actually supports the respondent because the case holds that courts must evaluate whether the discrepancy affects the substratum; here, the High Court found that the discrepancies went to the root of the prosecution case.
K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 — Held that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is rebuttable and if the accused can show that the death was accidental or that there was no demand, the presumption stands discharged.

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