Mr. Sibal, Section 21(3) of the RP Act begins with a non-obstante clause 'Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2)'. The word 'any' before 'constituency' is of wide amplitude. Why should we read 'any' as meaning only 'one' and not 'many' or 'all' when the reasons for revision are state-wide?

My Lord, the non-obstante clause merely overrides Section 21(2) which deals with ordinary periodic revision. It does not expand the geographical scope of the provision. Section 21(3) was enacted as an exceptional or residuary provision to address extraordinary situations in specific constituencies where an identified exigency warrants departure from the routine process. The legislative intent was not to authorise a sweeping statewide exercise that would render the structured revision process under Section 21(2) otiose. The word 'any' must be read in context. If Parliament intended to authorise statewide revisions, it would have said 'all constituencies' or 'the State'. Moreover, the requirement of recording reasons would be diluted if a single order with generalised reasons could cover every constituency, regardless of whether each constituency individually warranted a special revision. The Commission has not demonstrated that each of the 243 constituencies in Bihar required a special revision. Generalised reasons of migration and urbanisation cannot justify a constituency-specific exceptional power.

In Lal Babu Hussein, this Court was dealing with an adjudicatory proceeding where an objection was raised against an individual entry. The Impugned SIR is a systemic, inquisitorial exercise. Why should the same presumption apply when the Commission is not adjudicating a dispute but is discharging its constitutional duty to maintain accurate rolls?

My Lord, the presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act applies to all official acts, regardless of whether they are adjudicatory or administrative in nature. The inclusion of a name in the electoral roll is an official act performed after due verification. The presumption that official acts were regularly performed attaches to that entry. The nature of the proceeding does not determine the applicability of the presumption. Moreover, the petitioners are not arguing that the presumption is irrebuttable. We are arguing that the Commission cannot reverse the burden of proof and require every elector to re-establish their credentials without any specific doubt having been raised about their eligibility. The Impugned Order requires even electors whose names appear in the 2003 roll to submit enumeration forms, effectively placing the burden on them to prove their continued eligibility. This reverses the presumption and violates the principle that the burden lies on the authority seeking to displace an existing entry. Lal Babu Hussein explicitly held that the opportunity of hearing before deletion must be meaningful, and the concerned person must be informed why a suspicion has arisen. Here, no suspicion has been raised against individual electors; they are being subjected to a blanket verification without any cause.

Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules prescribes procedure for deletion of names. The SIR Guidelines provide for publication of draft roll, claims and objections, suo motu enquiry by ERO, notice to electors in cases of doubt, reasoned orders, and appeals under Section 24. Is this not compliance with Rule 21A in substance, even if the form differs?

My Lord, the critical violation is at the threshold. Rule 21A requires that before any name is proposed for deletion, the Electoral Registration Officer must prepare a list of such names and publish it, inviting objections. The deletion can only occur after giving the concerned elector a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In the Impugned exercise, 65 lakh electors were excluded from the draft roll solely on the ground that they did not submit an Enumeration Form. This exclusion occurred before any scrutiny, before any notice, before any hearing, and without any order by the ERO. The subsequent claims and objections process does not cure this initial violation because the burden shifted to the elector to come forward and prove eligibility. Under Rule 21A, the burden is on the ERO to initiate the process and to give notice. Here, the elector was required to take the initiative to submit a form, failing which automatic exclusion followed. This is a fundamental inversion of the statutory safeguard. The substance of Rule 21A is not preserved when the initial act of deletion is automatic and without notice.

The Commission has provided eleven documents, and this Court directed inclusion of Aadhaar as the 12th document. The EPIC is issued by the Commission itself. Why was it excluded? Is that not an admission that the EPIC is unreliable?

My Lord, the exclusion of the EPIC is perverse and undermines the entire exercise. The EPIC is the primary identification document issued by the Election Commission to every registered voter. It is the document that electors present at polling stations to establish their identity. If the EPIC is not acceptable as proof of identity for the purpose of electoral roll revision, the Commission is effectively admitting that its own identification document is unreliable. The justification that accepting EPIC would be circular is specious. The purpose of the revision is to verify eligibility, not to re-issue EPICs. An elector who possesses a valid EPIC issued by the Commission should not be required to produce any other document. The Commission's refusal to accept the EPIC demonstrates the arbitrary and exclusionary nature of the documentation regime. Similarly, the Ration Card is widely held and is accepted as proof of residence for various government schemes. Its exclusion without empirical evidence of widespread forgery is arbitrary. The documentation regime, as designed, disproportionately burdens vulnerable and marginalised communities who may not possess passports, driving licences, or bank passbooks. This violates the right to equality under Article 14.

For PetitionerConstitutional

ECI Lacks Power for Statewide Special Intensive Revision — (2026) INSC 564

The Election Commission has no power under Article 324 to conduct a statewide Special Intensive Revision when Parliament has fully occupied the field through the RP Act and Rules.

Association For Democratic Reforms & Ors. v. Election Commission of India & Ors. — (2026) INSC 564

Core Argument

The Election Commission has no power under Article 324 to conduct a statewide Special Intensive Revision when Parliament has fully occupied the field through the RP Act and Rules. Section 21(3) is a constituency-specific provision that cannot be used for a sweeping exercise, and the procedure violates Rule 21A and the presumption of citizenship.

Key Precedents

Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405 — Cited for the proposition that Article 324 operates only in areas left unoccupied by legislation, and the Commission must act in conformity with law made by Parliament.
A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984) 2 SCC 656 — Cited for the proposition that where the Act and Rules occupy the area, the Commission cannot override them or act in direct disobedience of their mandate.
Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995) 3 SCC 100 — Cited for the proposition that electors whose names appear on the electoral roll are entitled to a presumption of citizenship, and that this presumption cannot be displaced except by following the procedure prescribed by law.

Full Argument

The petitioners — Association for Democratic Reforms and others — submit that the Impugned Order dated 24.06.2025 directing a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in every Assembly constituency of the State of Bihar is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and violates the fundamental rights of electors under Articles 14, 21 and 326 of the Constitution of India.

The legal foundation for the petitioners' case rests on three core constitutional and statutory principles. First, Article 324 of the Constitution, which vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission, is not a freestanding reservoir of plenary power that may be invoked de hors the legislative framework. The settled constitutional position, as expounded by this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405, is that Article 324 operates only in areas left unoccupied by legislation. Where Parliament has made a law under Article 327, the Commission cannot leapfrog the same by resorting to its constitutional power. In A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984) 2 SCC 656, this Court held that where the Act and Rules occupy the area, the Commission cannot override them or act in direct disobedience of their mandate.

In the present case, Parliament has enacted the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RP Act) and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 (1960 Rules), which comprehensively govern the preparation, revision, and maintenance of electoral rolls. The Commission cannot, under the guise of Article 324, devise an entirely new regime of enumeration, documentary scrutiny, and deletion that supplants the statutory framework. Article 324 must be construed harmoniously with the statutory framework, not as an independent source of power to override it.

Second, even if the Commission could invoke Section 21(3) of the RP Act as the source of power, the provision does not authorise a sweeping statewide exercise. Section 21(3) empowers the Commission to direct a special revision of the electoral roll 'for any constituency or part of a constituency'. The use of the word 'any' cannot be interpreted to mean 'all' or 'many' without doing violence to the legislative intent. Section 21(3) was enacted as an exceptional or residuary provision to be used in extraordinary circumstances confined to specific geographical units where an identified exigency warrants departure from the routine revision process under Section 21(2). To interpret Section 21(3) as authorising a statewide revision would render the structured revision process under Section 21(2) otiose and would transgress the boundaries of the legislative purpose.

Third, the procedure adopted by the Commission is ex facie arbitrary and violates the statutory safeguards. The Impugned Order calls upon enrolled electors to re-establish their credentials through a wholly new and onerous process, effectively inverting the well-settled presumption of citizenship that attaches to existing entries. This Court in Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995) 3 SCC 100 unequivocally held that electors whose names appear on the electoral roll are entitled to a presumption of citizenship, and that this presumption cannot be displaced except by following the procedure prescribed by law. The Impugned exercise treats the 2003 electoral roll as probative evidence, but requires persons not listed therein to produce prescribed documents. This creates an arbitrary classification without any rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The selection of 2003 as the cut-off year lacks any legally sustainable basis, as the Commission has not placed on record any material demonstrating that the 2003 roll possesses special accuracy that subsequent rolls lack.

Fourth, the procedure for deletion violates Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules, which mandates that no name already entered in the electoral roll shall be deleted without prior notice to the elector and an opportunity of hearing. The Impugned Order provides that any elector who fails to submit an Enumeration Form by 25.07.2025 shall not be included in the draft roll. This results in automatic exclusion without any notice or hearing, in direct contravention of Rule 21A. The subsequent claims and objections process does not cure this initial violation, as the burden shifts to the elector to prove eligibility anew, whereas Rule 21A places the burden on the Electoral Registration Officer to initiate a suo motu enquiry and issue notice.

Fifth, the documentation regime prescribed by the Commission is arbitrary and exclusionary. The list of eleven documents excludes commonly held documents such as Aadhaar Card, EPIC, and Ration Card without any reasonable justification. While the Court directed the inclusion of Aadhaar as the 12th document, the EPIC and Ration Card remain excluded. The EPIC is issued by the Election Commission itself and is the primary identification document for voters. Its exclusion is perverse. The Ration Card is widely held and is accepted as proof of residence in many government schemes. The Commission's justification that these documents are susceptible to forgery is an admission of the failure of its own verification mechanisms, not a valid reason to exclude them.

Sixth, the Impugned exercise impermissibly empowers the Commission to scrutinise citizenship. Under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, the determination of whether a person is or is not a citizen of India falls exclusively within the domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, provides for reference to the Central Government for determination of citizenship. The Commission has no constitutional mandate or institutional competence to usurp this function under the pretext of electoral roll revision.

For all these reasons, the petitioners pray that this Court quash the Impugned Order dated 24.06.2025, declare that the SIR exercise is ultra vires the powers of the Commission, and direct the restoration of the electoral roll as it existed prior to the Impugned exercise, with appropriate directions to ensure that no elector is disenfranchised arbitrarily.

Tactical Note — When & How to Deploy

Deploy this argument when challenging a large-scale electoral roll revision exercise. First, establish that Parliament has fully occupied the field through the RP Act and Rules, and that the Commission cannot invoke Article 324 to override or supplant statutory provisions. Second, argue that Section 21(3) is a constituency-specific provision and cannot be used for a statewide exercise without doing violence to legislative intent. Third, rely on Lal Babu Hussein for the presumption of citizenship attaching to existing entries. Fourth, demonstrate violations of Rule 21A by showing automatic exclusion without notice or hearing. Fifth, challenge arbitrary documentation requirements and the exclusion of widely held documents.

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