ECI Has Power to Conduct Statewide Special Intensive Revision — (2026) INSC 564

Full Argument

The respondents — the Election Commission of India and supporting intervenors — submit that the Impugned Order dated 24.06.2025 directing a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in the State of Bihar is fully within the constitutional and statutory powers of the Commission and is supported by cogent reasons. The challenge mounted by the petitioners must be rejected.

The legal foundation for the respondents' case rests on the plenary nature of the Commission's powers under Article 324 of the Constitution. Article 324(1) vests in the Commission the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and State Legislatures. This power is not a residual or interstitial power that evaporates upon the enactment of parliamentary legislation. As held by this Court in Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India (1972) 4 SCC 664, the Commission does not act as a delegate of Parliament; it acts in its own right as the constitutional repository of electoral superintendence. In Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi (1985) 4 SCC 628, this Court held that the expression 'superintendence, direction and control' in Article 324(1) should be construed liberally, empowering the Commission to issue orders of a general or specific nature. In All Party Hill Leaders' Conference, Shillong v. Captain W.A. Sangma (1977) 4 SCC 161, this Court recognised that Article 324 is a source of wide power enabling the Commission to issue directions, including directions of a legislative or subordinate legislative character, to effectuate free and fair elections.

The interplay between Article 324 and Article 327 was authoritatively elucidated by the Constitution Bench in In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (Gujarat Assembly Election Matter) (2002) 8 SCC 237. The Court held that Parliament's power under Article 327 is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and that the general power of superintendence under Article 324 is subject to law made by Parliament, provided the law does not encroach upon the plenary powers of the Commission. The two provisions are complementary, not competing. The Commission must act in conformity with law, but where law is silent, Article 324 operates as a reservoir of power. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405, this Court held that the Commission shall act in conformity with law, but where such law is silent, Article 324 is a reservoir of power to act for the avowed purpose of pushing forward a free and fair election with expedition.

In the present case, the Commission has acted in conformity with Section 21(3) of the RP Act, which is a specific statutory provision authorising special revisions. Section 21(3) begins with a non-obstante clause overriding Section 21(2) and empowers the Commission to direct a special revision 'for any constituency or part of a constituency in such manner as it may think fit', with reasons to be recorded. The word 'any' must be interpreted in context. As held by the Constitution Bench in Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan (2005) 1 SCC 754, the word 'any' may mean 'all', 'every', 'some', or 'one or many out of several' depending on the context. Since the Impugned Order records state-wide reasons — the passage of 22 years since the last intensive revision, rapid urbanisation, large-scale migration (both intra-State and inter-State), non-reporting of deaths, and duplication of entries — a single order covering all constituencies is valid. Requiring the Commission to issue separate orders for each of the 243 constituencies would be an exercise in formalism that serves no constitutional purpose. The non-obstante clause read with the phrase 'in such manner as it may think fit' confers wide procedural discretion on the Commission to devise appropriate modalities for the revision.

The Commission has recorded cogent reasons in the Impugned Order. Clause 7 notes that the electoral roll has significantly changed in the last 20 years due to rapid urbanisation and frequent migration. Clause 8 asserts the Commission's constitutional obligation under Article 326 to ensure that only Indian citizens are on the electoral roll. Clause 9 invokes Section 21(3). These reasons are neither extraneous nor illusory. They bear a direct nexus to the constitutional mandate of maintaining accurate and credible electoral rolls.

On the presumption of citizenship, the respondents submit that the reliance on Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995) 3 SCC 100 is misplaced. That decision was rendered in the context of adjudicatory proceedings where a specific objection was raised against an individual entry. The observations regarding presumption were made in that context. The Court was not called upon to consider, nor did it pronounce upon, the scope of a systemic, inquisitorial verification exercise undertaken by the Commission in discharge of its constitutional mandate. The presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act is evidentiary and rebuttable. It does not operate as a blanket embargo on the Commission's power to undertake an intensive revision after 22 years of summary revisions. The last intensive revision in Bihar was conducted in 2003. For over two decades, the rolls have been carried forward through summary revisions, which do not entail the same rigour of verification. The Commission is entitled to treat the 2003 roll as a baseline and require verification for entries made thereafter. The classification is based on an intelligible differentia — the year of last intensive verification — and bears a rational nexus to the object of ensuring accuracy.

On the procedure under Rule 21A, the respondents submit that the SIR Guidelines preserve the safeguards in substance, even if the form differs. The process begins with house-to-house enumeration using pre-filled forms. The preparation of the draft roll is a provisional step; non-inclusion in the draft roll is not final deletion. The claims and objections period provides an opportunity for electors to submit claims. Where the ERO entertains any doubt regarding eligibility, Paragraph 5(b) of the Guidelines mandates a suo motu enquiry, issuance of notice, an opportunity to show cause, and a reasoned speaking order. Thereafter, an appeal lies to the District Magistrate under Section 24(a) of the RP Act, and a second appeal to the Chief Electoral Officer under Section 24(b). This framework incorporates the essence of Rule 21A — identification of doubtful entries, notice, hearing, reasoned determination, and appellate review — within a structured process appropriate for a large-scale revision. The requirement of notice and hearing is not dispensed with; it is operationalised at the claims and objections stage. The automatic exclusion from the draft roll for non-submission of enumeration forms is a provisional administrative step, not a final deletion. Final deletion occurs only after scrutiny, notice, hearing, and a reasoned order. The Court has also directed the publication of the list of excluded electors with reasons, further enhancing transparency.

On the documentation regime, the respondents submit that the Commission has acted within its discretion. The list of eleven documents is broader than earlier exercises. The exclusion of Aadhaar was justified by Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, which does not recognise it as proof of citizenship or domicile. However, this Court directed the inclusion of Aadhaar as the 12th document for identity verification. The exclusion of EPIC is justified because it is derivative of the electoral roll itself; accepting it as proof would be circular and would defeat the purpose of an independent verification exercise. The exclusion of ration cards is justified based on the Commission's assessment of their evidentiary reliability and concerns over forgery. The Commission is entitled to differentiate between documents based on their probative value in establishing the statutory conditions of eligibility. The documentation regime is not rigid; electors who do not possess any of the listed documents can still participate through the claims and objections process, where the ERO may accept alternative evidence.

On the scrutiny of citizenship, the respondents submit that the Commission is empowered to examine questions bearing upon citizenship for the limited purpose of determining eligibility for enrolment. Section 16 of the RP Act explicitly disqualifies non-citizens from registration. The Commission cannot discharge its duty to maintain a valid electoral roll without satisfying itself that persons included meet this threshold requirement. This is not a formal adjudication of citizenship under the Citizenship Act; it is an administrative satisfaction confined to electoral consequences. The respondents accept the clarification that any deletion on citizenship grounds must be referred to the competent authority under the Citizenship Act for adjudication, and that the Commission's determination does not operate as a final declaration of non-citizenship.

For all these reasons, the respondents pray that this Court dismiss the writ petitions and uphold the Impugned SIR exercise as constitutionally and statutorily valid.