Mr. Singh, your daughter has lived in this house since birth. How can you say she has no right to live here? This is her home as much as yours.

My Lord, the appellant has lived here, but her conduct has made it impossible for us to live together. She calls the police on trivial issues — we have call records showing multiple PCR calls. She has filed false molestation complaints against me, her own brother, and against our father. She has made the home environment toxic. The right to reside under Section 17 of the DV Act is not a license to abuse. If a child is elderly parents, she loses the moral and legal right to live under their roof. The Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja made it clear that consent is an essential element of a shared household. We have withdrawn our consent because of her conduct. She cannot force us to keep her in our home.

The SDM eviction order — was the appellant given notice? Did she have an opportunity to be heard before that order was passed?

My Lord, the appellant was given notice. The SDM passed the order after considering the matter. We do not have the full record of the SDM proceedings, but the order itself states that the SDM considered the appellant's conduct. The appellant did not challenge that order in appeal. It is final and binding. She cannot now collaterally attack it in DV Act proceedings. If she wanted to argue that the SDM order was passed without proper notice, she should have appealed it. She did not. Therefore, that order must be given full effect.

You offered alternative accommodation. But what guarantee does the daughter have that you will continue paying rent? If you stop paying after a few months, she will be homeless. The DV Act gives her the right to reside in the shared household, not just a right to temporary charity.

My Lord, the respondents are willing to make the payment arrangement formal through court orders. We have no objection to the court directing us to pay a fixed amount monthly to the appellant, and to pay rent directly to the landlord of a property chosen by the appellant herself. We are not trying to evade responsibility. We are simply saying that we cannot live with her. The DV Act does not require a family to live together in misery. Section 19(1)(c) of the DV Act specifically provides that the court may direct the respondent to secure alternative accommodation. That is what we are offering — alternative accommodation. That is a valid remedy under the statute. The appellant cannot insist on living in our home when the law provides an alternative remedy.

The trial court has not yet decided the domestic violence allegations on merits. How can you say the appellant is not a victim? Her complaints may be genuine.

My Lord, the appellant's complaints are not genuine — we deny them categorically. But the limited question before this Court on the Section 19 application was whether she should be granted a residence order pending trial. The trial court correctly held that given her conduct, the eviction order, and our offer of alternative accommodation, she is not entitled to an interim residence order. The merits of the domestic violence allegations are for trial. But the right to interim relief under Section 19 of the DV Act is discretionary. The trial court exercised its discretion based on the material before it. There is no error in that exercise. The Sessions Court affirmed it. This Court should not interfere.

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Right to Residence Not Absolute Against Parents — Harpreet Kaur

Section 17 of the DV Act must be balanced against the rights of senior citizen parents.

Harpreet Kaur v. Manvinder Singh

Core Argument

Section 17 of the DV Act must be balanced against the rights of senior citizen parents. Where the daughter has been evicted by SDM order, has refused offered accommodation, and is quarrelsome, the court should not grant a residence order.

Key Precedents

Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414 — Supreme Court held that the concept of shared household requires the woman to have lived there with the consent of the respondent; consent can be withdrawn.
S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru (2021) 15 SCC 730 — Supreme Court held that while the right to reside is important, courts must balance the rights of all parties, including senior citizens.

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