Pattern of False Cases Amounts to Cruelty — (2006) 4 SCC 558

Full Argument

The petitioner — Naveen Kohli — submits that the Allahabad High Court committed a grave error in reversing the Family Court's well-reasoned decree of divorce. The High Court's approach of examining each alleged act of cruelty in isolation is fundamentally flawed. This Court has consistently held that cruelty must be assessed by looking at the cumulative effect of the conduct, not by dissecting each incident as if in a laboratory. The wife's conduct, when viewed as a whole, reveals a deliberate, sustained, and malicious campaign to harass, humiliate, and imprison the petitioner.

The legal foundation for the petitioner's case is Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which provides for divorce on the ground of cruelty. As this Court held in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337, mental cruelty is that conduct which inflicts such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. What is required is that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party.

The evidence on record is overwhelming. The wife filed FIR No. 100/96 under Sections 379 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; another case under Sections 323 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; FIR No. 156 of 1996; an FIR under Section 420 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; a case under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; a complaint under Sections 498A, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. When the police filed final reports in two of these cases, she filed protest petitions to keep the litigation alive. She opposed the petitioner's bail applications. She filed a complaint before the Company Law Board under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956. She filed a complaint in Case No. 1365 of 1988. She filed a complaint at the Parliament Street Police Station, New Delhi, on 8 July 1999, making efforts to get the petitioner arrested. She sent a notice on 31 March 1999 breaking the HUF nucleus. She filed a complaint under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. She gave an affidavit before the High Court on 22 January 2001 and obtained non-bailable warrants against the petitioner. Most tellingly, she got an advertisement published in the national daily 'The Pioneer' declaring that the petitioner was merely her 'employee' and cautioning the business community not to deal with him. She also clandestinely withdrew Rs. 9,50,000 from the petitioner's bank account.

The High Court's reasoning that these actions 'could not be taken to be such which may warrant annulment of marriage' is unsustainable. The cumulative effect of 17 separate proceedings, spanning multiple years, cannot be dismissed as trivial. The wife's intent to harass is evident from her own admission that she opposed the petitioner's bail 'on legal advice' and that she filed protest petitions after the police filed final reports. These are not acts of a spouse seeking reconciliation; they are acts of a spouse determined to destroy the other.

The petitioner also relies on this Court's observation in Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706 that the approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference. Applying that approach, the only fair inference is that the petitioner has been subjected to mental cruelty of the gravest kind.

The petitioner further submits that the parties have been living separately for more than 10 years. The marriage has broken down irretrievably. There is no chance of reconciliation — a fact borne out by the wife's conduct of refusing to withdraw even the Rs. 5,00,000 deposited by the petitioner as per the Family Court's order. As this Court observed in A. Jaychandra v. Aneel Kumar (2005) 2 SCC 22, while irretrievable breakdown is not a ground by itself, it can certainly be borne in mind while determining whether the grounds alleged are made out.

The petitioner prays that this Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restore the Family Court's decree of divorce, and direct the wife to take her permanent maintenance as determined by this Court. The petitioner is willing to pay a reasonable sum to ensure that the respondent is not left destitute, but the marriage must be dissolved to allow both parties to live in peace.