Isolated Acts Do Not Amount to Cruelty — (2006) 4 SCC 558

Full Argument

The respondent — Neelu Kohli — submits that the High Court correctly reversed the Family Court's decree of divorce. The husband's petition for divorce is an abuse of process. He abandoned his wife and three sons in 1994, lived separately with another woman named Shivanagi, and now claims that the wife's legal responses to his abandonment constitute cruelty. This is a classic case of a spouse creating the very situation he complains of and then seeking relief based on that situation.

The legal foundation for the respondent's case is that cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 requires conduct that is 'grave and weighty' beyond the ordinary wear and tear of married life. As this Court held in Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi (2001) 4 SCC 250, matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human relationship, and it would not be appropriate to apply any submission as a straitjacket formula. Each case must be decided on its own facts.

The facts here demonstrate that the husband was the wrongdoer, not the victim. He left the matrimonial home in May 1994. From that point onward, he lived separately. The wife had to fend for herself and three sons. She had to protect her financial interests because the husband was trying to transfer property out of the family. She had to protect her reputation because the husband was spreading falsehoods. Her legal actions were defensive, not offensive.

Consider the public advertisement that the husband complains about. The advertisement stated that the husband was no longer employed with her firm and that business associates should avoid dealing with him. This was factually true — he had abandoned his duties. It was not a public humiliation; it was a business necessity to protect her firm from unauthorised transactions. The High Court correctly held that this could not by any stretch of imagination be taken to have lowered the prestige of the husband. He was, in fact, an employee of the firm. Truth is a defence.

Consider the criminal complaints. The husband does not dispute that he was living with another woman. The wife had every right to file a complaint under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, alleging cruelty. The fact that the police filed a final report does not mean the complaint was false — it may mean that the evidence was insufficient for prosecution. The wife's belief in her complaint was bonafide, as evidenced by her persistence. Filing a complaint that ultimately does not result in conviction is not evidence of malice.

Consider the bail opposition. The wife had every right to oppose bail. The husband was accused of serious offences. She believed he was a flight risk. The fact that she opposed bail on 'legal advice' is not an admission of malice — it is an admission that she followed proper legal procedure. The High Court correctly held that a spouse cannot claim cruelty merely because the other spouse exercises her legal rights.

Consider the non-bailable warrants. The husband had deposited Rs. 5,00,000 but the wife did not withdraw it because she wanted a decree of divorce, not just money. Her refusal to withdraw the money does not constitute cruelty. She had the right to pursue her legal remedies. The High Court correctly held that the husband had not shown that the wife's actions were without reasonable cause.

Most importantly, the High Court found that the husband was living with Shivanagi for a considerable number of years. The Trial Court's finding that this was 'not proved' was perverse. The evidence — including the husband's own conduct and the testimony of witnesses — supported the High Court's conclusion. A husband who lives in adultery cannot then claim that his wife's responses to that adultery constitute cruelty. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.

The respondent further submits that the parties have three sons, now adults. The marriage produced children. The institution of marriage should not be dissolved lightly. As this Court held in Chetan Dass, the institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in society, and it would not be appropriate to apply 'irretrievable breakdown' as a straitjacket formula for grant of divorce.

The respondent prays that this Court affirm the High Court's judgment, dismiss the husband's appeal, and direct the husband to pay adequate maintenance to the wife. The Family Court's award of Rs. 5,00,000 is grossly inadequate given the husband's financial standing — he owns three factories and a bungalow. The respondent is willing to live with the husband if he abandons the other woman and returns to the matrimonial home, but the husband has shown no inclination to do so.