Ms. counsel, if we accept your interpretation, what prevents chaos? Can an ICC summon any person from any department who ever visits that workplace, regardless of their employment relationship?

My Lord, the ICC's jurisdiction is not unlimited. The ICC can only inquire into complaints of sexual harassment that occur at its workplace. If a person from another department visits and commits harassment, that incident occurs at the ICC's workplace, and the ICC has jurisdiction over that incident. This is not chaos — it is the natural consequence of the broad definition of 'workplace' in Section 2(o) of the POSH Act. The purpose is to ensure that a woman is protected wherever she works, and that any person who harasses her at her workplace cannot escape by claiming to work elsewhere. The ICC does not acquire general jurisdiction over that person for all purposes — only for the specific incident that occurred at its workplace.

But how does the aggrieved woman's employer enforce the ICC's recommendations against the petitioner? Her employer cannot deduct from his salary, suspend him, or dismiss him. Doesn't that make the ICC's findings toothless?

My Lord, Section 13 of the POSH Act requires the ICC to send its report and recommendations to the 'employer' of the respondent. In this case, the ICC report will be sent to the Department of Revenue, which is the petitioner's employer. Section 13(2) of the POSH Act requires the employer to act on the recommendations within 60 days. The Department of Revenue has full disciplinary authority over the petitioner under the IRS service rules. There is no toothlessness — the findings are enforced through the respondent's own employer, which is statutorily bound to act. The fact that the finding is made by a different ICC does not reduce its binding effect; the statute creates an obligation on the recipient employer to act.

The Office Memorandum dated 16 July 2015 contemplates that the ICC acts as the inquiring authority under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. How can an ICC from a different department act as the inquiring authority for an employee of another department? The Rules do not provide for this.

My Lord, the respondent accepts that the ICC at the aggrieved woman's department cannot act as the inquiring authority under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for the petitioner. That is why we propose a two-stage procedure. Stage one: the ICC at the aggrieved woman's department conducts a preliminary fact-finding inquiry under Section 11 of the POSH Act. Its report is sent to the Department of Revenue under Section 13. Stage two: if the Department of Revenue issues a chargesheet, the ICC at the Department of Revenue acts as the inquiring authority under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for the formal disciplinary inquiry. The Office Memorandum does not prohibit this bifurcated procedure; it simply does not address it. The Court can read the POSH Act and the CCS (CCA) Rules together harmoniously to permit this approach.

The petitioner says he has not seen the sealed cover report and cannot show prejudice. But isn't it fundamentally unfair to subject him to an inquiry by a committee whose report he cannot even see?

My Lord, the sealed cover was submitted to the Court because the inquiry is ongoing and the report contains sensitive allegations. The petitioner will be given full access to the report once the formal disciplinary inquiry begins. He has already participated in the preliminary inquiry, submitted his written version, and cross-examined witnesses. No rule of natural justice requires that he see the report before it is furnished to the disciplinary authority. The Court itself examined the sealed cover report and found no prejudice. The petitioner's complaint is about jurisdiction, not about the fairness of the inquiry. On jurisdiction, he has been fully heard. On fairness, he will have ample opportunity in the second-stage inquiry.

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ICC at Aggrieved Woman's Workplace Has Jurisdiction — (2025) INSC 1415

The word 'where' in Section 11 of the POSH Act means 'if', not 'at the place where'. The ICC at the workplace where the harassment occurred has jurisdiction.

Dr Sohail Malik v. Union of India — (2025) INSC 1415

Core Argument

The word 'where' in Section 11 of the POSH Act means 'if', not 'at the place where'. The ICC at the workplace where the harassment occurred has jurisdiction. The definitions of 'workplace' are neutral and broad, and a two-stage procedure respects both the complainant's access to justice and the respondent's service rules.

Key Precedents

Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v. Davies (1968) AC 1097 — House of Lords decision holding that the word 'where' in statutes is often used as a conditional conjunction meaning 'if' or 'whenever', not as a reference to a physical place.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 — The foundational case establishing the Vishaka Guidelines, which the POSH Act was enacted to codify; emphasises that the objective is to provide a safe workplace free from sexual harassment.

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